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Abstract 
 
Governments around the world often make social cash transfers to their residents for varied 
purposes such as consumption smoothing, poverty reduction, improved take-up of education 
and health services, etc. In Pakistan, these transfers took a big stride with the initiation of 
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) in 2008. Social cash transfers have multiple types 
of impacts e.g. on health, education, reproductive behavior, voting behavior etc. This study 
aims to investigate the existence of a relationship between social cash transfers and poverty. 
Specifically, the research question is: Is there any impact of BISP receipt on poverty in 
Pakistan? This research question is answered with the help of utilization of Household 
Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) 2015-16 (Government of Pakistan, 2017) which presents 
information on households’ consumption (used to measure poverty) as well as households’ 
cash transfer recipient status.   Official poverty estimation methodology is used for defining 
the poverty status of a household. The relationship between cash transfers and poverty is 
studied through the nearest-neighbor matching method limiting ourselves to BISP. The 
findings show that there is no significant relationship between BISP cash transfer and poverty 
when full dataset is used and a negative but economically insignificant relationship when only 
people from the bottom consumption quintiles are considered. Based on these findings, way-
forward in terms of future research and making necessary modifications in the programme 
design of BISP is suggested.   
Introduction  
 
Governments around the world often make cash transfers to their residents for varied 
purposes such as consumption smoothing, poverty reduction, improved take-up of education 
and health services, etc. These transfers are often called social cash transfers or, simply, cash 
transfers. In Pakistan, these transfers in the form of pensions started soon after independence. 
However, transfers to assist the poor took a big stride with the start of Benazir Income Support 
Programme (BISP) in 2008. At the provincial level as well, there are many programmes 
providing direct cash transfers to the beneficiaries. Only in Punjab, in the financial year 2016-
17, there were around 26 cash transfer programmes providing regular or one-time benefits 
(Government of the Punjab, 2017). However, most of these programmes were small in size as 
compared to BISP.  
Due to the increasing coverage and size of cash transfer programmes, it is important to 
assess what impacts, these programmes, particularly BISP, have had.  
Social cash transfers have multiple types of impacts e.g. on health, education, 
reproductive behavior, voting behavior, etc. The focus of the study will be narrowed to only 
the poverty-related impacts of the cash transfers. This study aims to investigate the existence 
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of a relationship between social cash transfers and poverty. Specifically, the research question 
is: Is there any impact of social cash transfers on poverty in Pakistan?  
There have been many studies around the world that have measured the impact of cash 
transfers on poverty (for example, Agostini & Brown (2011) for Chile, Maitra & Ray (2003) 
for South Africa, and Van den Berg & Cuong (2011) for Vietnam). For Pakistan, Durr-E-
Nayab and Farooq (2014) evaluated the impact of BISP on poverty using the Pakistan 
Panel Household Survey, 2010. As BISP and other cash transfer programs (e.g. Khidmat Card 
for Persons with Disabilities by Punjab Social Protection Authority) have expanded since 2010, 
it is important to utilize the latest available consumption data as presented by Household 
Integrated Economic Survey (HIES), 2015-16.  Additionally, in previous studies of the similar 
nature, official poverty estimation methodology has not been used. Due to its wider acceptance, 
this study employs the official poverty estimation methodology which will make the results 
more relevant for the policymakers.  
The results of this study will help the policymakers to review the social cash transfer 
programmes and make the necessary modifications to make them more effective. The study 
would have policy implications regarding targeting of the social protection programmes as well 
as their coverage.  
Social cash transfers represent only one type of the benefits provided by the government 
and hence only a single side of the coin. The government also provides other benefits e.g. free 
or subsidized services, fee waivers, in-kind transfers etc. These benefits are offset to some 
extent by the taxes imposed on the households. Therefore, considering only the impact of cash 
transfers on poverty will yield a partial view of the situation. Agostini (2011) indicates, 
ignoring the tax burden of the households when consumption taxes are often regressive, the 
impact of social cash transfers on poverty may have an upward bias. However, due to data 
limitations regarding tax collection, in this thesis, we will estimate only partial effect of social 
cash transfers.  
Literature Review 
 
A Short History of Social Cash Transfers 
The welfare of the citizens has been a function of the state since the early period of 
civilization. The Indian emperor Ashoka, who ruled from 268 to 232 BC, introduced the policy 
of Dhamma, which included the welfare duties of the state (Thapar, 2002). Under this policy, 
Ashoka planted trees to provide shade to animals and humans, dug wells and built rest houses 
and watering places (Thapar, 2002).  
Welfare in the form of in-kind transfers for the citizens of the state could be traced as 
back as the Roman Empire in which grains were distributed at subsidized prices to the urban 
population (Erdkamp, 2013). Gaius Gracchus is credited to initiate the regular distribution of 
cheap grain in 123 BC. Initially, there were some restrictions on the distribution, however, in 
62 BC, Cato the Younger included ‘the poor and landless plebs’ in the eligible population 
(Plutarch, quoted in Erdkamp, 2013). Soon, in 58 BC, the price of this free ration was abolished 
altogether by Clodius (Erdkamp, 2013). 
Cash transfers as a form of social assistance also appear during the Roman Empire. 
Before Nerva, who ruled during 96-98 AD, there were instances of money given to the citizens 
as a gift (Ashley, 1921). However, imperial munificence reached new heights under Nerva who 
established child maintenance grants-'alimenta' (Ashley, 1921).  
If we trace the prevalence of cash and in-kind transfers in Islam, we find that they are 
instituted in Islam through Zakat- a mandatory charitable contribution-which is now most 
commonly given in the form of cash. The Quran provides for the levy and distribution of Zakat 
and specifies the purposes for which the Zakat proceeds could be expended:  
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“The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those 
whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the 
cause of Allah, and (for) the wayfarer” (The Quran 9-60, translated by Pickthall, 1997). 
The early Islamic state used to collect and distribute Zakat (El-Ashker & Wilson, 2006). 
In many Muslim countries, Zakat is still collected mandatorily.  
In the modern, non-Muslim world, one of the earliest cash transfer programmes was 
what has become known as “Speenhamland System”. In 1795, the local justices and clergymen 
of Speenhamland, Berkshire, UK, in response to high grain prices, decided to link the workers’ 
wages with the bread price (creating a minimum standard of living or a subsistence level). In 
this system, wage top-ups or allowances-in-aid-of-wages (as Blaug (1963) calls them), were 
given in proportion to the price of bread and the number of children in a worker’s family.  
 
The Rationale for Cash Transfers 
There is strong evidence that economic growth leads to poverty reduction. Many cross-
country and cross-regional studies (e.g. Besley and Burgess, 2003; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; 
Ravallion and Chen, 2007) support this assertion. One, then, naturally wonders what the need 
of cash transfers, or direct redistribution, is. The justification for cash transfers comes from the 
fact that benefits of the growth do not accrue to everyone particularly the poorest. On the other 
hand, cash transfers, through effective targeting, may reach the poorest in a more beneficial 
way (Fiszbein et al., 2009).  
Another justification for cash transfer is the relaxation of the liquidity constraint which 
can promote entrepreneurship in poor people (McKenzie & Woodruff, 2006). Lack of well-
functioning markets provides another justification for cash transfers. For example, if insurance 
markets are not accessible to the poor, and correcting these markets is difficult, the poor cannot 
smooth their consumption, which cash transfers can help smooth (Fiszbein et al., 2009).  
Fiszbein et al. (2009) highlight another situation where cash transfers are apt: disadvantages 
due to one’s parents “such as race, gender, or family background”, which represent inequalities 
of opportunity and which the state has an ethical responsibility to alleviate (Roemer, 1998).  
 
Types of Social Transfers: Differences in Impacts and Design Considerations 
A special form of cash transfers-conditional cash transfers (CCTs)-has become popular 
in recent decades. A CCT is a cash transfer made subject to compliance of the beneficiaries to 
certain conditions. Commonly, CCTs are made to poor households to incentivize them to 
change their behavior in terms of sending children to school, take-up services such as visits to 
health centres, etc. These programmes had existed since long ago, e.g. child benefits under the 
Family Allowances Act 1945 of the UK which provided benefits to families as long as their 
children were in schools. However, CCTs became popular after the success of Bolsa Escola 
(now, after some change in design, called Bolsa Família) programs in Brazil. Bolsa Escola 
programs were started in Campinas and Brasilia in the mid-90s (Sedlacek, Ilahi, & Gustafsson-
wright, 2000). Later, with the introduction of Mexico’s Progresa (later Oportunidades and now 
Prospera), CCTs became popular all across Latin America and other developing countries.   
There are pros and cons associated with the use of CCTs and many researchers have 
presented arguments for and against adopting CCTs. Below we present a short review of this 
literature, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of CCTs vis-à-vis in-kind transfers and 
unconditional cash transfers (UCTs).  
The "carte-blanche" (French for “blank document”) principle states that a transfer of 
money to a recipient is (as good as or) better2 than an equivalent transfer of specific goods or 
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services (in-kind transfer and CCT3) to her (Pfouts, 1977). That is so because the recipient may 
have different preferences giving her greater utility if she were allowed to spend an equivalent 
amount as per her own free choice.  
Besanko and Braeutigam (2014), through a graphical analysis, show that though an 
equivalent amount of UCT takes an individual to a higher level of utility than an in-kind 
transfer, the in-kind transfer induces the individual to consume more units of a good (say X) 
that the government wants that individual to consume. Thus, with in-kind transfers, the 
government can attain its objectives by spending fewer resources.  So, it can be said that even 
if in-kind transfers are not cost-effective in terms of raising utility, they ensure that the 
government’s objectives are fulfilled: in-kind transfers increase the consumption of X by those 
who would otherwise consume relatively little of that. For those persons who already consume 
equal or more than the government-desired level of good X, the in-kind transfer would not 
influence choices.  
 
Das, Do, and Özler (2005) compare welfare effects of CCT with UCT through the 
following diagram.  
 
Figure 1 Comparative Welfare Effects of CCT and UCT 
 
 
Source: Das, Do, and Özler (2005) 
 
The initial budget constraint is given by AB where a household can purchase a 
maximum of B of good X and A of good Y (we can assume Y is all other goods). Now, the 
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transfers are a type of conditional transfers where the transfer is made if a certain good (or service) is consumed. 
CCTs are analogous to the subsidies as well (Fiszbein et al., 2009). 
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government initiates a CCT program with the condition to consume at least X0. Compliance to 
the condition gives an additional income to the household of amount ED, altering the budget 
constraint to AEDC. Otherwise, the old budget constraint stays put. Three types of households 
are shown here. Type I household (dotted indifference curve) has a preference for Y and 
chooses to not enrol in the program (consumes less than X0). Type II household (dashed 
indifference curve) participates in the programme and complies with the condition (consumes 
X0). While, type III household (solid indifference curve) has a preference toward X  (pre-
programme consumption of X was more than X0 ) and keeps consuming the initial bundle (XIII). 
If instead of a CCT, the government would have given a UCT of an equivalent amount, 
the budget line would be the line CD (it would extend and touch the y-axis).  At this budget 
constraint, households of type I and type II would select bundles at indifference curves that are 
higher than the CCT case (so these households are strictly worse off with CCT). For households 
of type III, the indifference curves attained would be the same as in the CCT case (so they are 
indifferent between the two options and CCT and UCT are equivalent). 
How the economic theory discussed above stacks up against empirical evidence about 
the differential effect of cash grants and in-kind transfers on the expenditure on a specific 
good? In an experiment where 1000 recipients of food stamps were randomly selected 
and divided into food stamp and cash recipient groups, Whitmore (2002) found that 20 
to 30 percent persons belonging to the cash group spent less on food (compared to the 
food-stamp group) but a deeper look into their consumption pattern showed that they 
consumed less of soft drinks and juices. This low food consumption was not found to 
compromise nutrition, rather it reduced consumption of bad calories. Neither was there 
any indication of a difference in the consumption of alcohol amongst the cash group.   
We can compute the deadweight loss of using vouchers instead of making an 
equivalent-value cash transfer by computing the value of both of these types of transfers to 
the beneficiaries.  Using this approach, Whitmore (2002) found that of the 17 billion dollars 
expenditure on the food stamp programme, 500 million was deadweight loss (of giving stamps 
instead of cash). She termed this deadweight loss as the cost for political support for the 
programme.   
The consumer theory outlined above was also vindicated by another study of  United 
States’ Food Stamps Program by Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009), who employing 
difference-in-difference methods found that foods stamps were effective in increasing 
overall food expenditures (the out-of-pocket expenditure declined, though not in a 
statistically significant way). Additionally, this increase was greater for those 
households that had relatively low preference for food (22% increase) than for other 
households (15% increase) . They also found that most low-income families have relatively 
more preference for food and their marginal propensity to consume food is similar for cash 
income and food stamps. Thus, there was little distortion in the consumption choices as a result 
of the provision of food stamps instead of a cash grant.  
From the above analysis, UCTs may appear superior. However, the economic theory 
presented above expects individuals to be rational and well-informed and markets to be fully 
functional without market failures. Fiszbein et al. (2009, pp. 48-49), in the case, when these 
conditions are fulfilled and when the government is benevolent, declare favouring UCTs as 
“the “theoretical default” position”. In reality, these conditions are, at least sometimes, not 
fulfilled and there are a few explanations why, despite the purported welfare loss caused by the 
in-kind and conditional cash transfers, there so many programmes of such type being 
implemented globally?  
The classic explanation for the in-kind transfers is of paternalism (Currie & Gahvari, 2008). 
The argument is that the poor (or other eligible people), at least sometimes, cannot spend the 
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cash to their or their families’ greatest benefit as they do not know what is best for them or for 
their dependents4 (e.g. parents not sending the children to schools5). On the other hand, the 
policymakers or the taxpayers know what is better for the poor (and the society) and hence may 
direct choices of the poor. There has been opposition to paternalistic views as well. Those 
economists who subscribe to libertarianism think that the poor, like other people, can 
make the best decisions for themselves (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003).  Therefore, the 
issue if the people’s choices should be constrained remains unsettled and a 
normative one.  
Because of the targeted nature of many in-kind transfer programs and the restriction of 
the assistance to the goods and services thought to be really needed by the low-income groups, 
in-kind transfer programmes enjoy greater political support (Whitmore, 2002).  Adato and 
Hoddinott (2007) note the same political support for CCTs because of their potential favourable impacts 
on education and health outcomes. 
Explaining why such political support might exist, Handa and Davis (2006) opine that 
the political support for social assistance depends on “the values of society as well as of the 
characteristics of the poor” (p: 523). In countries where poverty is seen as a consequence of 
bad practices of individuals (e.g. low level of effort, wrong decisions) “or when the poor are 
easily identified as ‘different’” (p: 523), social assistance would enjoy less public support. 
Handa and Davis (2006) cite the example of Latin America where the poor are seen as different 
from mainstream society. By requiring poor people to change their behaviour, CCTs allay these 
political concerns (Handa & Davis, 2006). 
Similarly, in the United States ‘individualism’ leads to the perception of merit, based 
on productivity, and poverty is seen as a manifestation of inadequate performance (Tussing, 
1974). Consequently, welfare programmes also need to have a productivity basis. A welfare 
regime fostering dependence is disliked because it is seen as incentivizing bad performance 
(Tussing, 1974), in other words, helping undeserving poor.  
In the USA, in the 1960s the idea that welfare recipients could be made to attain 
economic self-sufficiency by providing them with the necessary social services gained 
currency. Ways and Means Committee of United States House of Representatives in 1962 
emphasized this new “self-liquidating” model of welfare and stressed the need of providing 
services to help recipient families achieve self-sustenance instead of being dependent on 
welfare, thus obviating the need for continued public assistance (Rein, 1969). Over time, the 
share of in-kind transfers has risen, while unrestricted transfers have fallen (Currie & Gahvari, 
2008).  
By requiring the recipients to adopt a socially-responsible behaviour, CCTs foster a co-
responsibility or reciprocity between the state and the citizens. This lessens the stigma 
associated with hand-outs and lends more dignity to the received benefits (Rawlings, 
2005). 
 
CCTs encourage human capital formation in order to break the cycle of 
intergenerational poverty (Rawlings, 2005, Samson, Niekerk, & Quene, 2010). In this way, in 
contrast to the UCTs, they focus on transient poverty (short-term income support for 
consumption smoothening) as well as permanent poverty (Rawlings, 2005). This combination 
of supporting consumption and encouraging human capital investments is seen by Ravallion 
(2003)
 as a correction for the market failures that propagate poverty. One of the market 
failures is the failure to internalize externalities such as education and health of 
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children which CCTs help internalize6 (Das, Do and Özler, 2004). However, in instances 
where education and health services are already significantly subsidized, using CCTs 
only on efficiency ground is justified only when these externalities are very large 
(Fiszbein, 2009).
  
However, there is a debate regarding whether other actions such as coupling UCTs with 
improvements in social service delivery would yield the same results as achieved by the CCTs 
(Britto, 2004). Even pure UCTs may achieve the desired social behavior. For example, if 
education is a normal good, increasing the income of a poor household may automatically lead 
to higher consumption of education services. In fact, de Carvalho Filho (2012) found that UCT 
to the elderly (old-age benefits) led to an increase in school enrolment of girls (particularly 
those aged 13–14) living with the UCT recipients (however there was little or no impact on 
boys’ enrollment, which may suggest using other options like CCTs for boys’ enrolment). This 
effect of UCT may be smaller than the effect of CCT of equivalent amount because CCTs have 
a substitution effect7 as well besides the income effect of a pure cash transfer (Fiszbein et al., 
2009).  
Similarly, the same desired results could be achieved, relatively cheaply, through what 
is known as labelled cash transfers (LCTs). LCTs are earmarked for certain goods and services 
only notionally and yet they elicit the desired behavior yielding what Jacoby (2002, p. 196) dubs as 
“intra-household Flypaper Effect8” or “labeling” effect. One explanation that Hines and Thaler 
(1995) have given of flypaper effect is the inability to take money as fungible9 (which 
represents a violation of rationality). If flypaper effects exist widely, it may be better to use 
UCTs instead of CCTs as UCTs would act as CCTs without having the additional costs 
associated with conditionalities (Fiszbein et al., 2009). However, there is not enough research 
available on these effects (Fiszbein et al., 2009). 
Besides the potential welfare-reducing impact of the CCTs in the short run, the 
following additional downsides of CCTs have been pointed out. 
CCTs, for their success, depend upon the availability of adequate education and health 
facilities (Rawlings, 2005). This may be against the interest of the poor as they often reside in 
the areas with poor quality of education and health services and may not be able to comply 
with the conditionalities and, hence, might get excluded from the CCTs (Rawlings, 2005). If 
facilities are not appropriate (e.g. health facilities with poor disease contamination control or 
schools where no or little teaching is imparted), compliance to the conditionalities may be 
harmful to the beneficiaries (Fiszbein et al., 2009).  Even otherwise, the cost of compliance to 
the conditionalities is higher for the poorest and therefore they have a greater chance of 
exclusion from the CCTs (Samson et al., 2010).   
CCTs usually have higher administrative costs (both financially as well as in terms of 
higher administrative capacity) due to compliance monitoring and coordination with the service 
providers but with the expansion of these programmes, economies of scale can be experienced 
(Morley & Coady, 2003). 
Summing up, the choice between UCT as CCT is not an easy one. Many factors 
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discussed above need to be considered before making a choice.  Fiszbein et al. (2009) also 
suggest using various combinations of UCTs, CCTs, and awareness provision to see how useful 
CCTs are.  
 
Conceptualization of poverty and impacts of cash transfers on poverty 
There is no universally accepted definition of poverty. A broad definition used by the 
World Bank (2000) is “poverty is pronounced deprivation in well-being” (p: 15). ‘Well-being’ 
itself refers to “whatever is assessed in an evaluation of a person’s life situation or ‘being’” 
(Gasper, 2002) or “the quality (the 'well-ness', as it were) of the person's being” (Sen, 1992). 
In other words, well-being is a description of a person’s life situation. Various measures of 
well-being have been devised-some narrowed to the situation of consumption or income (such 
as dollar a day poverty line of the World Bank in the 1990s), and some broad enough to include 
other dimensions of life (e.g. education and health), most famous among which are Human 
Development Index (HDI) introduced in United Nations Development Programme (1990) and 
Multidimensional Poverty Index devised by Alkire and Foster (2011). Both HDI and MPI are 
inspired from the Capability Approach of Amartya Sen who first presented the idea in 1979 
(Sen, 1979).  
Social cash transfers immediately help improve consumption, while improvements in 
other aspects of well-being take some time to realize. As we do not have any recent longitudinal 
data available for the beneficiaries of cash transfers in Pakistan, we limit ourselves to 
consumption-based poverty.  
A temporal classification of poverty is often made where two types of poverty are 
identified: i) chronic or permanent poverty, which people experience over an extended period 
of time, and ii) transient or temporary poverty, which people experience for short periods of 
time (see, e.g., Lipton & Ravallion, 1995). The transient poverty could be due to vulnerability 
to shocks such as income or health shocks and can push non-poor into poverty or poor into 
extreme poverty (Jalan & Ravallion, 2000).  
How cash transfers might affect poverty? First, as shown above, they immediately relax 
the budget constraint, catapulting the individuals to higher indifference curves and hence higher 
welfare levels.  This seems more relevant to address the transient poverty: income-stabilising 
or consumption-smoothing cash transfers will protect people from the income shocks faced by 
the transient poor (Lipton & Ravallion, 1995, Jalan & Ravallion, 2000; Alderman and Haque, 
2006).  
Second, if they are large enough, cash transfers may open the productive opportunities 
(e.g. education and health, etc.) for the poor (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006; Sadoulet et al., 2001). 
Lipton and Ravallion (1995) point out that addressing chronic poverty would typically need 
policies for making the poor more productive. As discussed in the previous section, CCTs, 
conditional on improved choices regarding human capital, can address transient as well as 
permanent poverty. 
Third, regular cash transfers help the poor to take up more risky alternatives thereby 
freeing them from low-risk low-return activities (e.g. farming low-risk crops) they partake to 
avoid income fluctuations (Carter & Barrett, 2006; Dercon, 2004; Lipton & Ravallion, 1995; 
Ravallion, 1988).  
It is important to note that small cash transfers may not be able push people out of 
poverty (Van den Berg & Cuong, 2011). Though Devereux (2002) admits, “consumption-
smoothing interventions can have mean-shifting outcomes” (p. 673), he declares the poverty 
impact of cash transfer “a function of the size of the transfer and its contribution to total 
income” (p. 666). 
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Selected Empirical Evidence on the Impacts of Cash Transfers on Consumption and 
Poverty 
Cash transfers have been shown to have diverse impacts ranging from health to 
education to labor supply to family relations (see Fiszbein et al. (2009) for further details). 
However, our focus here will be on consumption-based poverty. As movement out of poverty 
(of the selected type) is helped by an increase in consumption, here we cover studies evaluating 
the impact of cash transfers directly on poverty as well as those quantifying the impacts of cash 
transfers on consumption.  We begin with studies on the impact of cash transfers on poverty.  
Agostini & Brown (2011) estimate the impact of various government cash transfers on 
poverty in Chile. In Chile, data on income and transfers is representative only at the regional 
level. However, Agostini & Brown note that due to potential geographic heterogeneity in 
impacts, it is important to study the effects of transfers at the county level (which is below the 
region level). For this purpose, they employ poverty mapping methodologies (which combine 
survey and census data) to find heterogeneity in the effectiveness of transfers across counties. 
2003 Encuesta de Caracterizaci´on Socioecon´omica (CASEN) data is combined with the 2002 
Chilean census.  By comparing estimates of poverty before and after transfers, Agostini & 
Brown (2011) found that transfers lead to an economically and statistically significant 
reduction in headcount ratio10 at the county level in Chile. However, these reductions are 
greater (ranging from 0 per cent to 67 per cent) in rural areas as compared to urban areas (where 
reductions range from 0 per cent to 25 per cent). These results confirm the hypothesis of 
heterogeneity in the impact of cash transfers on poverty. These results also imply that targeting 
at low levels of aggregation can lead to greater success in poverty alleviation. 
Maitra and Ray (2003) using the South African Integrated Household Survey, 1994 
studied the effects of private as well as public transfers on welfare. Their model allows for joint 
endogeneity of the expenditure shares and resource variables. They found that private, as well 
as, public transfers (pensions) have a significant and negative effect on poverty. They also 
rejected the notion of pooling of income coming from different streams and found that different 
sources of transfer have a differential impact on expenditures, which implies that it indeed 
matters who, within a household, receives the transfer. 
Van den Berg and Cuong (2011) studied the impact of cash transfers on poverty in 
Vietnam separately for public and private transfers using Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Surveys (VHLSS) of 2004 and 2006.  Their results indicate that public transfers had a 
negligible impact on poverty. On the other hand, domestic private transfers (domestic 
remittances) had a greater impact on poverty: they led to about 2 per cent reduction on the 
headcount ratio (coupled with a substantial reduction in the depth as well as the severity of 
poverty). The differential impact was attributed to the fact that private transfers had greater 
coverage of the poor and more of private transfers was used for consumption, while public 
transfers had low coverage and low benefit amount.  
Durr-E-Nayab and Farooq (2014) evaluated the impact of Benazir Income Support 
Programme (BISP) on poverty using the Pakistan Panel Household Survey, 2010. They 
employed the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method and found no significant 
difference between treated (i.e. those households which received BISP assistance) and 
untreated households in terms of poverty. Additionally, the magnitude of the difference 
was negative in some specifications and positive in other. 
Cheema et al. (2016) conducted a household survey of BISP-recipient and non-
recipient households to study the impact of BISP on poverty (measured using the 
nationally used cost-of-basic-needs approach). They used fuzzy regression discontinuity 
design and failed to find any statistically significant impact of BISP on poverty headcount 
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ratio. Cheema et al. (2016) suggested that this lack of effectiveness was due to small benefit 
size of BISP cash transfer.   
Azeem, Mugera and Schilizzi (2019) studied the impact of different social 
protection benefits in Punjab, Pakistan using Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2011. 
They employed PSM method to compute the average treatments effects of various social 
protection programmes such as BISP, Watan card11, Zakat, pensions (public and private), 
private financial assistance and utility stores. Azeem, Mugera and Schilizzi found that 
Watan card, public pensions, and utility stores had positive impact on expenditures while 
some public transfers such as BISP and Zakat had negative impact on expenditures. They 
attributed this lack of effectiveness to inadequate and irregular transfers under 
programmes such as Zakat and BISP and limited coverage of these programmes.  
Skoufias, Unar and de Cossio (2015) analysed the impacts of in-kind and cash transfers 
under the Food Support Programme12 in rural Mexico. The longitudinal data was collected from 
5851 households in 2003-04 (baseline) and 2005 (follow-up). The programme provided food 
to most of its beneficiaries and cash (equivalent to 75% of the market value of the food package) 
to a small proportion of isolated communities where the distribution of food was difficult. An 
experimental design at the community level was adopted. First, 208 rural communities were 
selected randomly and then 33 households from each sampled community were randomly 
selected. These communities were then divided into two treatment (one for in-kind and one for 
an equivalent cash transfer) and one control groups randomly. Using the difference-in-
difference approach and intention-to-treat impact estimates, the authors found that cash transfers 
reduced food poverty by 13.5 per cent as compared to a 15.7 per cent decrease observed for the 
in-kind transfer. There was no significant difference in the impacts of cash transfers (recall that 
they are 75% of the market price of the food package) and food transfers on food consumption. 
However, in the case of non-food expenditures, cash transfers have a positive impact, while in-
kind transfers have no significant impact.  Thus, in Skoufias et al.’s (2015) study, cash transfers 
seem to be more effective for increasing welfare.  
 Kyzyma and Williams (2017) measured the impact of various types of social transfers 
on the probability of rising above or falling below poverty. They used European Community 
Household Panel data, collected over 1994-2001 annually, and country-level transfers-related 
variables to capture the heterogeneity of welfare regimes. Poverty was measured in relative 
terms in each country (households below 60 per cent of median income were classified as poor). 
Kyzyma and Williams found that poverty impacts differ for different transfers: i) 
unemployment transfers in conjunction with effective active labor market programmes had the 
higher probability of helping individuals exit poverty as compared to unemployment transfers 
working in an environment with no active programmes; ii) unemployment benefits had a strong 
negative relationship with the probability of entering poverty provided that they had significant 
progressivity (progressivity here is the relation between the size of the transfer to the means of 
the beneficiary) across different quintiles of income; iii) old-age benefits had strong positive 
relationship with exiting poverty and strong negative relationship with the entering poverty 
when the benefit amount was substantial and had not much progressivity; iv) family transfers 
were found to have strong negative impact on poverty duration when they had little 
progressivity and were not liberal in benefit amount; v) Like for the case of unemployment 
transfers, family transfers also had stronger negative impact on the probability of entering 
poverty when working in an environment of supporting in-kind programmes (child care 
facilities).   
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12 Programa de Apoyo Alimentario in local language.  
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The literature cited above has focused on the individual effects of cash transfers. 
Angelucci and Giorgi (2009), however, present experimental evidence using Oportunidades 
(which is a CCT) data, that cash transfers to eligible households also have a positive impact on 
the expenditures of other households of the community. Ineligible households’ insurance and 
credit constraints are relaxed by receiving more loans from eligible households. Given these 
benefits to the overall local economy, Angelucci and Giorgi suggest doing randomization at 
the village level instead of individual level which may underestimate the true impacts.  
However, Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) pointed out that the possibility that these 
spillover effects may be overestimated as in their own study, through a randomized controlled 
trial of a UCT in rural Kenya, they found small negative spillover effects on consumption. The 
UCT, which carried generous benefit (at least double of the household consumption in the 
covered area), was given to the poor households. Randomization levels were villages and 
households. Multiple treatment arms were created by randomizing gender, transfer frequency, 
and benefit amount. Haushofer and Shapiro found that the UCT, after nine months of its start 
in 2011, increased the monthly consumption expenditure of beneficiaries by a hefty 22 per cent. 
They also found that regular, monthly transfers enable the poor to secure their food better than 
infrequent transfers, which are more likely to be allocated towards the durables, (implying that 
poor households’ savings and credit prospects are constrained). This difference between 
frequent and infrequent transfers has been detected by Aguila, Kapteyn, and Perez-Arce (2017) 
as well in a study for Mexico.  
Maluccio (2010) examines the impact of a CCT in Nicaragua on expenditures using 
experimental methods and community-based randomisation. The results show that the CCT 
increased current expenditures (particularly food expenditure). However, Maluccio found only 
weak evidence for increases in agricultural and non-agricultural investments and hence saw 
limited scope for an increase in the consumption over the long run (ignoring the returns from 
the human capital investment that the CCT ensured).  
Attanasio and Mesnard (2006) study the impact of a CCT in rural Colombia (Familias 
en Acción), which focused on health, nutrition, education, and consumption of the beneficiary 
households.  Using the quasi-experimental method of comparing treated areas with areas not 
selected for the programme and using the difference-in-difference technique, Attanasio and 
Mesnard (2006) found that the CCT had significantly increased food consumption as well as 
total consumption. An analysis of the composition of expenditures showed that the CCT also 
led to the consumption of better quality food (particularly consumption of more proteins). 
Additionally, the CCT contributed to resource redistribution from adults to children by 
increasing expenditures on children’s education and clothing. 
Perova and Vakis (2012) evaluate the impacts of a CCT (Juntos) in Peru after five years 
of the start of the programme. Juntos distributed cash among women conditional on behaviour 
change related to school attendance, nutrition, and health check-ups. Perova and Vakis asked 
if the programme’s benefit depends on the duration of the programme. They employed the 
instrumental-variable method and found that the impacts were higher in case of almost all of 
the outcomes for those beneficiaries who spent a longer time in the programme, though such 
differential effects were not very large.  Juntos provided around 15 per cent of average 
household expenditure but led to large changes in consumption (33 per cent increase) and 
poverty (14 per cent reduction in the headcount ratio).  
Another evaluation of Juntos is done by García (2017), who computed the impact of the 
transfer on the consumption of merit and demerit goods.13 Using panel data from Peruvian 
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 Musgrave (1957) presented the idea of merit goods. These are goods that are thought to be good for the society 
and that sometimes are not consumed adequately at the individual level necessitating state’s interference in 
consumers’ preferences. Undesirable wants that have to be restricted (such as use of liquor) then become demerit 
goods.  
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National Household Survey 2009–2014, García employed the fixed-effects model to show that 
the programme contributed to increases in the food consumption and expenditure on children 
(education, clothing, footwear). There was no change in the expenditure on demerit goods (such 
as soft drinks, alcohol and tobacco). García credits the awareness-raising component of the 
programme as the factor behind higher expenditure on food and children.  
 Schady and Rosero (2008) assessed the impacts of a UCT on women in rural Ecuador 
(Bono de Desarrollo Humano) using a randomized design. They found that the UCT 
contributed to significantly larger food shares for the households in the treatment group than 
for those in the control group. Other studies showing increased expenditure on food or nutrient-
rich food include Cunha (2014), Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004), and Macours, Schady, and 
Vakis (2012). Cunha (2014) also found that in-kind transfers had a greater impact on the intake 
of food than cash transfers. 
 Like Schady and Rosero (2008), some other studies have tried to investigate if the cash 
(or asset) transfer to women has any differential impact on expenditures and other outcomes. 
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), for example, found that a greater share of wives in the cash 
income of the family contributed to higher food budget share. For a pension program in South 
Africa, Duflo (2003) also found that cash transfers improved the health and nutrition of girls 
(there was no effect on boys), while the same transfer to men had no such effect.  
 The empirical literature reviewed here generally agrees that cash transfers lead to 
increases in consumption (particularly food) and contribute to poverty reduction. However, the 
results for Pakistan (Durr-E-Nayab & Farooq, 2014 and Cheema et al., 2016) were not in 
line with this general trend, very encouraging in terms of the impacts of BISP on poverty 
reduction. Given the findings from the literature on negative impacts of cash transfers on 
poverty, particularly the finding by Perova and Vakis (2012) that longer duration in the 
programme is associated with greater impacts, it may be opportune to study the impact of BISP, 
which is quite old now (being born in 2008), on poverty in Pakistan. Furthermore, there is no 
study that has analysed the poverty impacts of BISP using the HIES 2015-16 data. The present 
study tries to cover this gap.   
 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
As the cash transfers are most commonly made to alleviate short-term and/or long-term 
poverty, assessing the impact of cash transfers on poverty is of natural interest. Therefore, this 
study aims to investigate the existence of a relationship between social cash transfers and 
poverty. Specifically, the research question is: Is there any impact of social cash transfers on 
poverty in Pakistan?  
To answer the question above, i) we need to define and measure poverty and ii) find a 
way to measure the causal effects of the cash transfers on poverty. This chapter delineates our 
approach towards these two tasks.  
 
Measurement of Poverty 
As indicated earlier, in this thesis we limit ourselves to consumption based approaches 
to poverty. The rationale behind this choice is that we want a measure that fits in Pakistan’s 
context and is not constrained by data availability. The government of Pakistan has officially 
measured poverty using three approaches: food energy intake method, cost-of-basic-needs 
method and MPI (Government of Pakistan, 2016a). The first two of them rely on the 
consumption data (more details below) that is available in the Household Integrated Economic 
Survey (HIES). The MPI approach relies on a broad set of data across three key human 
development dimensions-health, education and standard of living, represented through 10 
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indicators (for details, see Government of Pakistan, 2016b). The data for MPI comes from the 
Pakistan Standard of Living Measurement Survey (PSLM). The data on the receipts of cash 
transfers is available in HIES but not in PSLM, with no linkage between the two surveys. 
This limits our choice to consumption-based measures of poverty only as MPI cannot be 
calculated through HIES. 
If a comparison between consumption and income is made, it has often been the opinion 
of researchers working on developing countries' data that consumption is better reported than 
income (e.g. see Deaton & Zaidi, 2002). Consumption, as compared to income, also “provides 
a more accurate measure of the value of the transfers to the households and thus of the welfare 
households are able to attain as a consequence of these transfers” (Skoufias, Unar & de Cossio, 
2013, p: 407).  
The Government of Pakistan (2003b) presented first-ever official estimates of poverty 
in Pakistan using intermittently available household surveys for the period 1986-87 to 2000-01. 
These estimates were based on what is known as Food Energy Intake (FEI) Method.  FEI 
approach works through a Calorie- Expenditure Function as under14:  
1. a minimum level of monthly calorie intake is defined for every equivalent adult15 (call 
this Kmin); 
2. a monthly per adult  equivalent expenditure level is determined, through the regression 
equation (Engel curve relationship16) shown below, such that at the expenditure so 
determined the required calorie intake is barely met (call this Z) 
Ln ?̂? = ?̂? + ?̂? Kmin ; 
and 
3. this expenditure level is set as the poverty line below which all households are poor. 
 For step one, the Government of Pakistan (2003) used the caloric intake of 2350 
kilocalories per adult equivalent per day as the caloric norm (the caloric norm in urban areas is 
2150 calories and 2450 calories in the rural areas). For step two, the total consumption 
expenditure of the bottom 60 per cent of the population was used in the regression to preclude 
the impact of the consumption behavior of the upper classes on the poverty line. The poverty 
line derived in step three was Rs. 673.54 per adult equivalent per month in 1998-99.  
It is assumed that the consumption expenditure sufficient for meeting the calorie 
requirements (that is the expenditure equal to the poverty line) would also be sufficient for 
meeting the essential non-food needs. This is so because everyone, including the poorest, 
normally spends something on non-food items and households meeting the calorie 
requirements are expected to meet their non-food needs at the minimum as well.  
The Government of Pakistan (2016a) reports that dissatisfaction with the official 
poverty numbers arose when the 2007-08 estimate of 17.2 per cent headcount ratio was met 
with scepticism. The estimate looked counter-intuitive given the slowdown in economic 
growth and increasing inflation at that time. When the new estimate (12.4 percent) for the year 
2010-11 was released, the debate heightened further (Government of Pakistan, 2016a). In 
response to such criticism, and to capture the variation in non-food consumption in a better 
way, the government adopted a new methodology-called cost-of-basic-needs (CBN) 
approach-when the poverty numbers were released for the year 2014-15.    
Poverty, on the basis of the cost of basic or minimum needs, was first measured by 
Rowntree (1901) who defined a basic consumption bundle and then estimated its cost. Other 
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 This part is largely based on Government of Pakistan (2003a).  
15
 A simple equivalence scale is used in which children below 18 years of age are assigned a weight of 0.8, while 
adults are assigned a weight of one (Government of Pakistan, 2018).  
16
 Engel curve is the relationship between the nominal expenditure on (or budget share of) a particular good to 
total expenditures. 
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notable poverty measurements using minimum expenditure requirements include Beveridge 
(1942), Orshansky (1965) and Ravallion (1994). The approach used for official poverty 
measurement by the Government of Pakistan (2016a) is closely based on Ravallion (1994). 
The detail of the methodology adopted by the Government of Pakistan is described below17:  
Step 1: First, a consumption aggregate is computed. The consumption aggregation 
requires three steps: (i) aggregation of consumption expenditure, ii) adjustment for the variation 
in the cost of living across different areas, and iii) adjustment for household composition. These 
steps are elucidated below.  
(i) Aggregation of consumption expenditure: The HIES 2015-16 captures multiple 
types of cash and in-kind expenditures including items purchased from the market, and those 
received as remuneration, gifts or assistance. In the first step, a nominal aggregate of 
consumption is constructed by adding spending on food items and non-food items.   
The values of all food items (except tobacco) consumed from every source are summed 
to calculate total food expenditure. For the purpose of calorie conversion, quantities are needed 
for every food item which for some items are not available in HIES for some households. 
However, in these cases, expenditures are reported, which combined with median price 
information from other same-cluster households yield quantities.  
Non-food items include clothing and footwear, education, health, housing, utilities, 
transport, fuel, and recreation and communication, etc. For housing, the rental value of the 
residence occupied is included. This rental value comes from self-reported rent reported by 
renters and non-renters/owners. Only expenditures of recurrent nature are considered. 
Infrequent expenditures e.g. property taxes and fees, and repair and maintenance expenses are 
not considered. Due to data limitations precluding estimates of the value of services accrued 
from the durable goods, spending on durable goods is excluded from the consumption 
aggregate.  
Some expenditures are reported in HIES on a fortnightly basis, some on a monthly basis 
and some other on a yearly basis. All of these expenditures are converted to a monthly basis.  
Values reported for fortnights are multiplied by 2.17 to arrive at monthly estimates.   
 (ii) Adjustment for the variation in the cost of living across different areas: Due to cost 
variations across the country, the nominal expenditures are adjusted by constructing a spatial 
price index using the Paasche formula for each primary sampling unit (PSU). The formula  for 
the price index PIk for psu k is18: 
*ln
k
k i
i
i
pbs
p
k
i
Pl e
      
where  
 𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑘 is budget share of consumption item i at the psu k 
 𝑝𝑘𝑖  is the median unit value19 for each item at the PSU-level. Both the budget shares and 
the median unit values are weighted by the PSU population.  
 pi is the national median unit value for each item, acting as the reference price for the 
index.  
The calculation of unit value in the above formula implies that only items with the 
quantity as well as the expenditure information can be considered. Expenditure and quantity 
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 This is based on Government of Pakistan (2018). 
18 Deaton (2003) shares this approximation of the Paasche Index:  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑃ℎ ≈ ∑𝑤𝑘ℎ ln⁡(𝑝𝑘ℎ𝑝𝑘0) 
The index used by Government of Pakistan (2018) is a modification of this index.  
19
 Unit values are used as proxies for prices and are calculated for each item as: total expenditure divided by the 
units consumed. 
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data is available in HIES for most of the food items and some non-food items. One case where 
expenditure and quantity information is not available for each item is when different items are 
reported in groups. So these have to be excluded. To ensure a meaningful contribution to the 
price information, only households consuming at least five different items are included. 
  (iii) adjustment for household composition: to account for the variation in household 
size and age composition that may affect consumption needs and behavior, equivalence scales 
are used. CBN uses the same equivalence scale as in the case of the FEI method.  
 Step 2: A reference group is defined (that included households that lie in the 10th to 40th 
percentile of the distribution of per adult equivalent consumption expenditure20) and the 
average quantity consumed of each food item by this group is taken (call this reference food 
basket) and multiplied by each item’s median price paid by the group’s households to obtain 
expenditure on each food item, aggregating which yields the total food expenditure (FE) on the 
‘reference’ food basket (which captures prevailing diet patterns).  
Step 3: Caloric intake given the reference basket (calrefgrp) is calculated by converting 
the quantities into calories using a calorie conversion table and aggregating the caloric values.  
Step 4: If calrefgrp is lower than the required minimum level of 2350 calories per adult 
equivalent per day (the same caloric standard as in FEI method), FE is inflated by the ratio 
of the caloric requirement to calrefgrp to give Food Poverty Line (FPL). Thus FPL= FE∗2350calrefgrp.21 
Scaling-up FE ensures that each household at the FPL can meet the minimum caloric 
requirements.  
Step 5: The average food budget share (Sf) is calculated through an iterative process 
with ten iterations22. In the first iteration, Sf is computed for those households whose food 
expenditure is within one per cent of the FPL. In the second iteration, this band is expanded to 
two per cent. In the subsequent eight iterations, the band is successively increased by 1 
percentage point. The final Sf is the average of Sf. of these ten iterations. This methodology of 
computing Sf gives more weight to the households in the initial iterations (lying closer to the 
FPL) as they remain part of subsequent iterations. “This is also the reason behind non-food 
needs being more adequately captured through the CBN method as compared to the FEI 
method” (Government of Pakistan, 2018, p: 16). 
Step 6: The non-food component is added by inflating the FPL by Sf.  Thus, the Total 
Poverty Line (TPL) is: TPL=⁡𝐹𝑃𝐿⁡𝑠𝑓 ⁡23. 
There are two choices as regards the non-food expenditure level to be used for the 
allowance for the non-food items. Ravallion (1994) classifies them as lower and upper bounds 
of the poverty line. Using the non-food expenditure level of those households “who can only 
just afford the stipulated food bundle” (Total expenditure = FPL) gives the lower bound24while 
using the non-food expenditure level of the households who actually spend enough to meet 
minimum nutritional requirements (FE=FPL) gives the upper bound.  The Government of 
Pakistan (2016b) uses this upper bound for setting its poverty line. However, Sf of the reference 
group households whose FE is almost equal to the FPL (instead of strict equality of FE and 
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 Exclusion of the lowest 10 percent means that consumption of population in higher brackets of consumption 
would be the welfare standard for the bottom ten percent population. This is said to be a more representative 
benchmark for poverty estimation in line with the best practice. 
21There are some food items for some households for which only cost information is available. In this case, the 
information from other households where both cost and quantity of those food items are available is used to 
compute average cost per calorie. 
22
 Wodon (1997) also uses ten iterations of this non-parametric method in his study for Bangladesh.  
23
 Alternatively TPL= FPL*(1+Share⁡of⁡nonfood𝑆𝑓 ). 
24
 A household that is able to meet the food requirements but chooses, instead, to spend on some non-food items 
must see those non-food items as the bare essentials (Ravallion, 1994).  
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FPL) is used for the calculations.  
Why FPL is called up rather than having an objective measure of non-food expenditure 
is due to these reasons: i) unlike minimum energy requirements for FPL, no similar anchor is 
available for non-food needs, and ii) usually the price data of non-food items is either not 
available or is unreliable (Ravallion & Bidani, 1994).  
The above methodology yielded the poverty line of Rs. 3,030.32 per month per adult 
equivalent using the then latest available HIES 2013-14 data, using which poverty headcount 
rate for Pakistan was calculated to be 29.5 per cent. For the HIES 2015-16, this poverty line was 
updated, using CPI inflation, to Rs. 3250.28 per adult equivalent per month (Government of 
Pakistan, 2018). 
 
Methodology for Causal Impact 
For establishing causality between the intervention and the outcomes, experimental 
methods e.g. randomised control trials (RCTs) have gained recognition as a (pseudo) gold 
standard. However, an RCT for the evaluation of many cash transfer programmes in Pakistan 
is not possible because the cash transfer programmes in Pakistan do not make randomized 
assignment-a necessary condition for the RCTs. Therefore, quasi-experimental methods are the 
second-best choice in these situations. Most popular quasi-experimental methods include 
difference-in-difference or double difference (DD) method, matching methods, Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD) and Instrumental Variable Design. Of these methods, we prefer 
matching methods as other methods have some shortfalls for our purposes. For example, the 
double-difference (DD)   method requires baseline information of the recipient and non-
recipient households, which is not available in the case of cash transfer beneficiaries in HIES. 
So this method is ruled out. RDD is used where a cut-off is used for the selection of the 
beneficiaries. The results of RDD are applicable to a sub-group of the beneficiaries around the 
cut-off point. Therefore, it is not desirable either. Given these constraints, we adopt matching 
methods. 
Matching is a non-experimental method of estimating treatment effects or impacts of 
an intervention. It is based on the potential outcome framework (originally proposed by Fisher 
(1935) and exposited later by Rubin (1974)), in which every individual has a well-defined 
outcome for different treatment levels. Here we consider binary treatments with t = 1 showing 
the treatment and t = 0 indicating no treatment. For binary treatment, potential outcomes are 
binary as well with 1y  denoting the outcome after receiving treatment (i.e. when t=1) and 0y  
is the outcome without the treatment (i.e. when t=0). As an individual i can, simultaneously, 
be in one of the treatment and control groups only, we can observe wither 1iy or 0iy , not both 
(implying a missing-data or missing-counterfactual problem). Matching solves this problem by 
comparing the outcomes of treated individuals (“participants”) with those of non-treated 
matched individuals (“nonparticipants”). Two popular approaches of matching are covariate 
matching and propensity score matching. Both of these approaches match individuals on the 
basis of their similarity to each other in terms of observed characteristics or covariates (for 
example 
,1 ,2 ,{ , ,..., }i i i i px x xx  is a vector of covariates for the observation i). Further detail is 
provided in Annex-1.  
There are two types of treatment effects with regard to the population being represented: 
average treatment effect (ATE) which considers the impacts on the overall population and the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), which considers impacts on only those persons 
that are treated. The ATE estimate is given by: 
1 1 0( )E y y    
While, the ATET estimate is given by: 
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1 1 0( | 1)E y y t     
We will use ATET in our study because most, if not all, social cash transfers in Pakistan 
are targeted and benefits to the non-treated households are not expected to be material.   
Hoddinott, Gilligan, and Taffesse (2011) informed that NNM is generally less 
restrictive than PSM as “it is completely nonparametric, requiring no assumptions about the 
distribution of the error terms” (p: 79), while PSM requires such assumptions as it relies on the 
probit or logit models for computing the probabilities. NNM also does not rely on bootstrapped 
standard errors and, hence, has more acceptable and efficient tests of significance. However, 
we will employ both methods in order to see the robustness of results under the different 
models.  
For this study, HIES 2015-16 is used as the data source. HIES 2015-16 covered 24,238 
households from all across Pakistan except Federally Administered Tribal Areas and military 
restricted areas (hosting about two percent of the total population of Pakistan) during 
September, 2015-June, 2016 (Government of Pakistan, 2017). HIES contains information on 
household consumption by each item as well as the information on any cash transfers received 
by the covered households. The household consumption information is used for computing 
poverty using the CBN method as outlined above and the NNM and PSM techniques are used 
for establishing causal effects of cash transfers on poverty in Pakistan.  
The calculations are performed using the software Stata 14.2.  
 
Estimation Results 
 
Based on the CBN approach, we calculate the headcount ratio (percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line or ratio of the number of the poor to the total 
population) using the HIES 2015-16 data. The results are reported in Table 1.    
 
Table 1 Poverty Incidence in 2015 (Headcount Ratio-Percentages) 
 
Rural Urban National 
30.68 12.53 24.33 
 
Poverty, as could be expected, is the highest in the province of Balochistan where 42 
per cent of the population lives below the poverty line.  
Table 2 below shows a provincial disaggregation of poverty. An interesting finding is 
that the province with the least headcount ratio is Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa instead of Punjab 
which had had this distinction over the past many years.  
 
Table 2 Poverty Incidence by Province in 2015 (Headcount Ratio-Percentages) 
 
Province Balochistan Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Punjab Sindh 
Headcount ratio 42.19 18.02 20.9 32.08 
 
If we see the percentage of the population living below the first consumption quintile, 
the results, reproduced in Table 3, corroborate with the above findings.  It is Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa which boasts the least proportion (14.52 per cent) of the population living in the 
bottom quintile.  
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Table 3 Percentage of Population in the Bottom Quintile 
 
Province Balochistan Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Punjab Sindh 
Percentage of 
the population 
in the bottom 
quintile 
37.33 14.52 16.45 27.65 
 
For employing the matching methods, we need to select observable variables that 
correlate with the probability of programme participation and the outcome variable (poverty, 
in our case) but do not experience quick changes after the receipt of small cash transfers i.e. 
variables that are largely time-invariant (Hoddinott, Gilligan & Taffesse, 2011).  
As the methodology of Proxy Means Testing relies on a strong correlation of the 
variables with the consumption poverty, our choice of indicators was also influenced by the 
indicators used in the PMT approach adopted in Pakistan as mentioned in Hou (2009). The 
household characteristics considered are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Variables and their Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Region 
Shows geographical location of the household with 1=rural, 
and 2=urban. 
Persons per room 
Calculated as number of persons in a household divided by 
number of rooms. 
Own dwelling 
House owned by the household =1, Otherwise (on rent, 
subsidized rent, or free) = 0). 
Flush toilet 
Flush connected to public sewerage, pit or open drain=1,   
dry raised latrine, dry pit latrine or no toilet in the 
household=0. 
Landholding Size (in acres) of agricultural land owned by the household. 
Value of livestock Expected value (in Rs.) of currently owned animals. 
Education of head The highest grade completed by the head of the household. 
No. of dependents25 Count of persons aged less than 18 or greater than 64. 
 
The selected indicators were checked in terms of their correlation with poverty status. 
The results are given in Table 5.  
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 No. of dependents is selected instead of dependency ratio, as it had greater correlation with poverty than the 
dependency ratio.  
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Table 5 Correlation of Different Variables with Poverty Status  
 
Variable Pearson's Correlation Coefficient 
Region -0.223 
Persons per room 0.404 
Own dwelling 0.012 
Flush toilet -0.294 
Landholding -0.013 
Value of livestock 0.010 
Education of head -0.248 
No. of dependents 0.305 
 
Given that own dwelling, landholding and value of livestock had a relatively low 
correlation with poverty status, we dropped these variables from the analysis. To confirm the 
relevance of these variables logistic regressions were run with the selected variables as 
independent variables and BISP receipt and poverty status as independent variables. The results 
are reproduced in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 Relevance of Selected Variables through Logistic Regression  
Dependent 
Variable 
BISP Receipt Poverty Status 
Parameter Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Variables  
Region -0.568* 0.801 -0.447* 0.064 
Persons per room 0.167* 0.168 0.341* 0.017 
Flush toilet -0.640* 0.083 -0.868* 0.071 
Education of head -0.098* 0.009 -0.110* 0.007 
No. of dependents 0.137* 0.015 0.149* 0.018 
Constant -2.092* 0.126 -1.644* 0.114 
Wald chi2 (5) 1079.26 1443.96 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -6,423,442.6 -69,109,555 
Number of 
observations 24,238 24,238 
* Significant at one percent significance level.  
The results from the logistic regression show that all of the selected variables 
significantly explain the variations in the dependent variables (BISP receipt and poverty status).  
Table 7 below presents the average values of the selected variables and a few more 
variables of interest.  
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Table 7 Mean Values of Selected Variables 
 
Variable 
Non-
Poor Poor 
BISP  
Non-Recipient 
BISP 
Recipient 
Poor and 
BISP 
Recipient  
Household size 5.91 7.99 6.17 7.83 8.89 
Parsons per room 2.93 5.02 3.21 4.68 5.62 
Per adult equivalent monthly 
expenditure (Rs.) 6,824 2,688 6,237 3,714 2,591 
Flush toilet 82.0% 50.0% 78.0% 49.7% 37.0% 
Education of the head (years) 5.64 2.37 5.25 2.31 2.04 
BISP receipt 6.0% 18.0%   
Poor  17.24% 41.19%  
No. of dependents 2.81 4.7 3.05 4.52 5.4 
 
Table 7 shows that only 18 per cent of the poor are receiving BISP assistance, which 
points out to a low coverage of the programme. However, there might be some under-reporting 
as well because, normally, people hide their financial details from the enumerators. Another 
interesting finding is that of all of the BISP recipients only 41 per cent were poor considering 
the official poverty line. This is an indication of targeting efficiency of BISP.  
Figure 2 sheds further light on targeting efficiency of BISP by comparing the 
distribution of per adult equivalent total expenditure of overall population (bars) and of BISP 
recipients (line). The line extends furthest in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa indicating 
that comparatively richest persons from this province were enrolled in the BISP. With poverty 
line at Rs. 3,250.3 per month, the red line, ideally, should not extend beyond the third bar.  
 
Figure 2 Comparison of Per Adult Equivalent Expenditure of  
Overall Population and BISP Recipients 
 
 
 
 
Now, we report the results of the matching estimation. First, the results of our preferred 
method-nearest neighbor method- are reported in Table 8.  
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Table 8 Average Treatment Effects of BISP on Poverty 
 
ATET Estimate .024 
Standard error .013 
P-value .058 
95% confidence interval -.001-.050 
Distance metric used Mahalanobis 
Number of observations 24,238 
 
 
 
The results show that, contrary to the expectations from such a large cash transfer 
programme, BISP does not have a significant effect on poverty. The weak relationship that 
emerges from these results is that the BISP-recipients are marginally (two per cent) more likely 
to be poor than the non-recipients.  
However, given the low targeting efficiency of BISP, it may be more meaningful to 
calculate the poverty impacts for the bottom-quintile population only. Table 9 presents the 
results of the nearest-neighborhood estimation with the restricted sample (bottom-quintile 
population only).  
 
Table 9 Average Treatment Effects of BISP on Poverty (Bottom-quintile population)  
 
ATET Estimate -4.29e-16 
Standard error 1.82e-17 
P-value 0.000 
95% confidence interval -4.65e-16 - -3.94e-16 
Distance metric used Mahalanobis 
Number of observations 3,048 
 
 
The restricted sample results are encouraging and show a negative impact of BISP on 
poverty. The ATET estimate is significant but the effect size is so small that it is almost 
meaningless.   
To check the robustness of the findings, we also ran a propensity score matching 
regression using the same variables. We tried some variation in the model to compute the 
propensity scores in order to check the robustness of the results by using logit as well as probit 
based regression. The findings are shared in Table 10.  
 
Table 10 Average Treatment Effects of BISP on Poverty 
 
Model Logit Probit 
ATET estimate .031 .026 
Standard error .013 .013 
P-value .019 .047 
95% confidence interval .005 - .057 .000 - .052 
Number of observations 24,238 24,238 
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Compared to the full-sample nearest-neighbourhood method, the ATET estimates of 
PSM are significant and indicate that the BISP recipients are around three per cent more likely 
to be poor than the non-recipients. This surprising result, while showing that our results are not 
robust, also casts doubt on the performance of the BISP programme.  
We also did an exercise similar to the ATET estimates with NNM. The results, shown 
in Table 11, remain the same in terms of direction of the effect, though the effect size becomes 
much smaller with the restricted sample of bottom-quintile population as compared to the full 
sample.  
 
Table 11 Average Treatment Effects of BISP on Poverty (Bottom-quintile population)  
 
Model Logit Probit 
ATET estimate 3.26e-15 2.24e-15 
Standard error 1.38e-16 9.49e-17   
P-value 0.000 0.000 
95% confidence interval 2.99e-15 - 3.53e-15 2.06e-15 - 2.43e-15 
Number of observations 3,048 3,048 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
The estimation results based on nearest-neighbour matching method have shown that 
BISP has no significant impact on poverty when all population is considered and economically 
insignificant negative impact when the sample is restricted to the bottom-quintile population 
only. These results are not robust as changing the method to PSM produces different results. 
Our results are contrary to the evidence presented above, from multiple countries, that indicates 
negative effects of cash transfers on poverty (e.g. Agostini & Brown, 2011; Maitra & Ray, 
2003; Van den Berg & Cuong, 2011). However, our findings fall in line with Cheema et al. 
(2016) and Durr-E-Nayab and Farooq (2014) who found no significant impact of BISP on 
poverty headcount ratio. A few explanations of our results are in order. 
First, consider the benefit adequacy of the BISP cash transfer. BISP was transferring 
approx. Rs. 1,611 per month (BISP, 2017) to poor families26 in 2016, the year which roughly 
corresponds to the data collection period of HIES 2015-16. For those poor who are receiving 
the BISP assistance, the benefit size becomes Rs. 205 per month per adult equivalent27. From 
Table 6 in the previous chapter, per month per adult equivalent expenditure for the poor 
receiving BISP assistance is Rs. 2,591, while the national poverty line is Rs. 3,250 per adult 
equivalent per month. If we add Rs. 205 to Rs. 2,591 the mean expenditure of the poor BISP 
recipient becomes Rs. 2,796, which is clearly below the poverty line and does not help the 
BISP beneficiary to graduate out of poverty. This relationship between low benefit amount and 
low impact on poverty is consistent with the literature cited above (Azeem, Mugera and 
Schilizzi, 2019; Cheema et al., 2016; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006; Sadoulet et al., 2001; Van den 
Berg and Cuong, 2011). 
Second, there might be negative labor supply effects of BISP cash transfer leading to 
low own-source income generation by the BISP recipients as compared to the non-recipients. 
                                                          
26
 The concept of a ‘family’ is a bit different than that of a traditional ‘household’ used in the household surveys 
in Pakistan. A family is defined by BISP as a group composed by: (i) husband, wife and their unmarried children, 
if any; and ii) a divorced/widowed woman and her unmarried children, if any. Thus, the presence of an ever-
married woman is essential for the existence of a family. However, this difference is supposed to be immaterial 
for our purposes.  
27
 Author’s calculation.  
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Cheema et al. (2014) reported lower labour participation rates in males (no impact on females 
or overall) and attributed that to reduced labour participation by the elderly and the sick males. 
However, a later study by Ambler and de Brauw (2019), which partly used the same data as in 
Cheema et al., did not find any change in the household labor supply.  A disaggregation by 
gender actually showed an increase in male labor supply. Though, the results of both of the 
studies are consistent for the overall household labour supply, the differences in the results 
regarding male labor supply warrant further research. Nevertheless, the small benefit size of 
BISP makes the expected negative labor supply effect small as well. Further research needs to 
be conducted to shed more light on this issue.  
An interesting point on the issue of benefit size is that one might argue that the benefit 
size is set deliberately low in order to reduce disincentives for labour supply. Then, if a negative 
labour supply effect does exist, a case could be made to further reduce the benefit size. 
However, that could be detrimental to the interests of the poor. Therefore, a balance has to be 
achieved and further research needs to be conducted to establish the linkages between labour 
supply and BISP transfers.  
Adequacy of the benefit amount also hinges on the intended objective of the 
programme. One may argue that graduating people out of poverty was never the objective of 
the UCT under BISP (the main assistance type under BISP28), rather it was just a measure of 
consumption support. However, given the effectiveness of cash transfers for poverty reduction 
worldwide, it is high time that the government realized the potential of BISP for graduation 
from poverty.   
Any estimation based on household surveys gets fraught with the errors that creep in 
due to misreporting by the respondents. In countries like Pakistan, often people do not reveal 
what benefits they are receiving due to stigma associated with it or in an effort to avoid taxation. 
This under-reporting might be affecting our results as well. Better data capturing methods (e.g. 
coupling household surveys with administrative data) are needed to arrive at better results.  
The targeting efficiency of 41 per cent found in our calculations also leaves a lot of 
room for improvement. A targeting efficiency of 41 per cent means 59 per cent of the BISP 
beneficiaries are non-poor (according to the official poverty line). Improving the targeting 
efficiency (i.e. ensuring that only poor get the assistance) might also make BISP more effective. 
BISP uses the Proxy Means Test (PMT) approach for the identification of the poor. This 
approach relies on a short set of questions regarding household demographics, housing, and 
assets (see Hou (2009) for more details with reference to Pakistan). However, as Kidd, Gelders, 
and Bailey-Athias (2017) report, the PMT approach is, by design, fraught with high inclusion 
and exclusion errors. Circumventing these errors through a more inclusive PMT design/cut-
offs and data triangulation by using administrative data (e.g. sale and purchase of property and 
durables) is recommended.  
Though the results related to the coverage might not be an important factor in improving 
the regression results that we have, improved coverage is, nonetheless, important for 
eliminating extreme poverty from Pakistan. The coverage of BISP is found out to be only 18 
per cent i.e. only 18 per cent of the poor receive BISP benefits. This is inadequate to defeat the 
demon of poverty in Pakistan. It is recommended to free-up the resources from elsewhere and 
create fiscal space for increasing coverage of the BISP.  
Another area that might warrant further research is the payment frequency of the BISP 
cash transfer. Currently the transfers are made after every three months. If the programme's 
objective is consumption smoothing, "quarterly payment for consumption smoothening" 
becomes an oxymoron.  Consumption will be smoothed when income is smoothed as 
consumption depends largely on income. Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) through an RCT find, 
                                                          
28
 Waseela-e-taleem-a CCT for education of children of primary-school age was launched in late 2012.  
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"Monthly transfers are more likely than lump-sum transfers to improve food security, whereas 
lump-sum transfers are more likely to be spent on durables" (p: 1973). Given this finding, 
changing the BISP cash transfer payments frequency is recommended for better results in terms 
of poverty reduction.  
Annex-1 Methodology of Nearest-neighbor Matching (NNM) and 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM)29  
 
Nearest-neighbor Matching (NNM)  
The NNM estimator was derived by Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011). It performs 
covariate matching by matching each individual with the similar individual(s) from a different 
treatment group on the basis of a vector of covariates and uses matched individuals’ outcomes 
for predicting the unobserved potential outcome. The ‘neighbourhood’ (or similarity) for the 
matching purpose is defined by the distance between the vectors of the covariates (xi and xj).  
This distance is parameterized by the Euclidean vector norm30: 
1 1/2|| || {( ) ( )}i j i j i js    x x x x S x x  
where S is a given scaling matrix, which is symmetric and positive-definite. See StataCorp 
(2015) for different choices for S.  
NNM may lead to bad matches i.e. matches with observations far apart from each other 
despite being the closest. To overcome this problem and improve the matching, a tolerance 
level is imposed on the distance, which is called a caliper (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Under 
this method, only individual lying within the limit specified will be selected. If there are only 
a limited number of matches, the estimates would have a larger variance. However, it is difficult 
to decide the reasonable level of caliper limit (Smith and Todd, 2005). Here we denote the 
caliper limit || x x ||i j , by c such that || x x ||i j s c  . 
Using the abovementioned distance functions, the set of nearest-neighbor indices for 
observation i becomes: 
 
 
We can choose the number of matches (mi for the ith individual) to work with. Here mi 
is the minimum number fulfilling the following condition for the number of elements in each 
set
x
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    31, where w is frequency weight.  The mi may not equal m 
because of ties or the insufficient number of individuals falling within caliper limit of distance 
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29 The details here are largely based on StataCorp (2015).  
30 A norm is a function that gives a strictly positive length to a vector.  
31
 For convenience we use x( ) ( )mi i   later on.  
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The formula for the estimate ( 1ˆ ) of ATET is:  
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If the variance of the ATET is made conditional on the covariate information, this is 
called the conditional variance of the ATET estimator, which can be shown in the terms of 
conditional outcome variance.  The conditional outcome variance for ATET estimator-
2 var( | x )i ti iy  -could be substantially smaller than the variance of ATET ( 2ˆ  ). If we assume 
2
i  to be homoscedastic (i.e. if it does not vary with the covariates or treatment), it can be 
calculated as: 
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If 2i is heteroscedastic, the value of 2i need to be estimated at each observation. 
Instead of matching on observations from different treatment groups, here matching within the 
same group is required.  
The set of same-treatment matched individuals is: 
 
1 2 l( ) { , ,..., | ,|| x x || || x x || , , i k kxh h j i i j i l i ki j j j t t s s t t l j         
 
where h is the required size of the set. The number of individuals in each set, | ( ) |xi hh i  , will 
depend on ties and the caliper limit.  For convenience ( ) ( )xhi i   will be used.  
We estimate 2i by:  
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Propensity Score Matching 
The Propensity-Score Matching (PSM) method was devised by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) who showed that under certain conditions (discussed below) the probability of 
programme participation or treatment (called propensity score) can be used to solve the missing 
counterfactual problem and predict the treatment effects. The validity of PSM requires 
fulfilment of two conditions: (a) no effect of unobserved factors on the program participation 
(conditional independence) and (b) good common support or overlap between propensity 
scores of the participating (treated) and non- participating (non-treated) households (Khandker 
et al., 2009).  
In this method, propensity scores for each individual (or household) conditional on the 
observed characteristics are computed and then participating and non-participating individuals 
are matched based on the propensity scores (matched non-participating households act as the 
comparison group). More formally, a treatment model (TM), ( , , )ip t z , called a propensity 
score,  is used to compute the probability of an individual i receiving treatment t conditional 
on covariates zi.  
PSM has the advantage that multiple continuous covariates do not necessitate bias 
correction, rather these covariates are combined into treatment probabilities (propensity 
scores), thereby yielding a single continuous covariate on which matching is performed. This 
enables the researcher to compare different TMs in terms of goodness of fit using standard 
methods (e.g. information criteria) before proceeding with the nonparametric matching.  
In this case, the set of nearest-neighbour indices for individual i, i = 1,…, n, is: 
1 2( ) { , ,..., | 1 ,| ( ) ( ) | | ( ) ( )|,  1- ,  }i k kpm m j i l i ki j i li j j j t t p t p t p t p t t t l j          
where ( ) (z , , )iip t p t  and m is the required number of matches. The mi operates in the same 
way as in NNM with 
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A set of same-treatment matched individuals is (on the lines of NNM),  
1 2( ) { , ,..., | ,| ( ) ( ) | | ( ) ( )|,  ,  }i k kph h j i l i ki j i li j j j t t p t p t p t p t t t l j         
where h represents the required number of matches in the same-treatment group. The value of 
| ( ) |pi hh i  for i = 1,…, n, depends on ties and caliper’s value. These sets ( )ph i  will be used 
in the computation of standard errors for 1ˆ . 
PSM differs with NNM in the computation of the matching set. Once the set is defined, 
the estimate of ATET is computed in the same way under both methods. However, the variance 
of the ATET estimate needs an adjustment as estimated rather than known parameters are used 
( is used instead of  ). Abadie and Imbens (2016) have derived the adjusted variance which 
takes the following form: 
[27] 
 
2 2
1 1
,adj     
    
     c V c V  
where V  is the variance-covariance matrix of TM coefficients.  
The adjustment term c for the ATET estimate has two components, c  = ,1c + ,2c , 
defined as 
1
,1 1 0
1
1
1
c z (z )( )
n
i i i i in
i
i i
i
w f y y
t w
  


  
 
,2 1 0
1
1
(1)1
c (z ) cov( , ) cov(z , )
(0)
n
i
i i i ii in
i i
i i
i
p
w f z y y
pt w
 


      
 
where  
( ,1, )( )
( )
i
i
i
dpf
d
   
z
z
z
, 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )( )
1
cov( , )
( )( )
1
h
h
h
h
j j i j i
j i
ij
j i
i ti
ij j j i
j i
j
j i
w y y
if t tw
y
w y y
otherwise
w
 


 


       




z z
z
z z
 , 
and  
tiy   
( )
( )
h
h
h
h
j j
j i i
j
j i
j j
j
j
j
w y
if t t
w
otherwise
w y
w
 
 






 
 
and the sets of matched individuals within the same treatment arm, ( ) ( )ph hi i     , are:  
1 2( ) { , ,..., | , ,| | | |,  ,  { , }}i k kph h k j i l i ki j i li j j j j i t t p p p p t t l i j           
The use of the notation ( ) ( )ph hi i     and ( ) ( )ph hi i   signifies that the same- and 
different-treatment clusters in the calculation of 
2
,adj consider h, not m used in the calculation 
of 1 , although h = m can be set. 
[28] 
 
The computation of 1

 in the formula of the adjusted variance requires additional 
cluster sets (denoted as ( )m iz , for i = 1,…, n.), which are made by matching on the different 
treatment group using the covariates
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